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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS-
THE FIRST PRONOUNCEMENT OF PRECISE
STANDARDS FOR STATE AID TO
PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS
The Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act' authorized the payment
by the state of a fifteen percent salary supplement directly to teachers
of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools. To qualify for the
supplement, a teacher had to teach a course offered in public schools,
to use textbooks approved for public school use, and to agree not to
teach a course in religion. Furthermore, a teacher had to teach in a
school where the per-pupil expenditure did not exceed the per-pupil
expenditure in public schools. Nonpublic schools were required to sub-
mit data on enrollment and total expenditures. If this data indicated
per-pupil expenditures were in excess of the per-pupil expenditures in
public schools, state auditors examined the books in question to deter-
mine how much of its spending was attributable to secular education
and how much to religious education. 2  Plaintiffs, citizens and tax-
payers of Rhode Island, sought a declaratory judgment contending that
the statute was violative of the federal constitution3 and an injunction
to prevent its continued operation. They contended that the goal of
the parochial schools, the Act's primary beneficiaries, was the propaga-
tion of religion and, therefore, the supplement resulted in an estab-
lishment of religion. The three-judge federal district court 4 found that
1. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 16-51 to 9 (Supp. 1969).
2. The federal district court found only one instance in which this breakdown
between religious and secular expenses was necessary. The school in question,
was not affiliated with the Catholic church. DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp.
112 (D.R.I. 1970).
3. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
4. The three judge federal court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2281, 2284 ( ). Section 2281 reads: "An interlocutory or permanent in-
junction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by
restraining . . . the enforcement or execution of such statute . . . shall not be
granted by any district court judge thereof upon the ground of unconstitutionality of
such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district
court of three judges. . ....
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the Act resulted in excessive government entanglement with religion,
and violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.5  On appeal to the Supreme Court the case was consolidated
with Lemon v. Kurtzman.6
The Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education
Act 7 provided that the state shall pay public funds to applying non-
public elementary and secondary schools in order to reimburse them
for having rendered secular educational services through the teaching
of certain subjects.8 Reimbursement to a school was authorized only
for the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks and instructional materials
to the extent that such cost had actually been incurred by the institu-
tion. Lemon, a citizen and taxpayer of Pennsylvania, 9 sought a de-
claratory judgment and injunction on the ground that the statute vio-
lated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the Constitu-
tion. 1 The federal district court 1 dismissed the complaint challenging
the validity of the Act, holding that it failed to state a claim for
relief. 12 Speaking for the Court and seven of its members, 13 Chief
Justice Burger held that the statute violated the first amendment by
fostering "excessive entanglement between government and religion.' 4
Lemon v. Kurtzman and Early v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
This decision is significant because it represents the Supreme
Court's most recent effort to formulate a judicial guideline concerning
the constitutionality of state aid to parochial schools. In addition,
5. Supra, note 2, at 122.
6. 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1969).
8. Section 5604 of the Act limited all purchases to courses in mathematics,
modem foreign languages, physical science and physical education.
9. For the fundamental aspects of standing as to the right of taxpayers to
challenge state expenditures which infringe upon the Establishment Clause, see,
e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1967); Doremus v. Board of Education,
342 U.S. 429 (1952); see also, Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a
Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Arthur Garfield Hays Civil
Liberties Conference: Public Aid to Parochial Schools and Standing to Bring Suit,
12 BUFF. L. REV. 35 (1962); Jaffe, Standing to Secure ludicial Review: Private
Actions, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1265 (1961).
10. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof ....... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Supra, note 4.
12. Supra, note 6, at 49.
13. The vote in the Pennsylvania case was 8-0 as Justice Marshall did not par-
ticipate in the decision. The vote in the Rhode Island case was 8-1 as Justice
White wrote a dissenting opinion.
14. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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the decision places a substantial barrier in the path of proponents of
parochial aid who had been encouraged by Supreme Court decisions
over the past twenty-four years,' that sometimes suggested that the
constitutional question was not "whether" government should help, but
"how." The purpose of this casenote is to familiarize the reader with
the decision, focusing upon the "entanglements test" as the primary
constitutional standard in parochial aid questions. This note will further
analyze the decision in light of relevant case law, discussing possible
acceptable alternatives within the framework of the "entanglements
test," and consider the decision's impact on future developments in this
area of the law.
The first amendment contains a two-pronged prohibition on govern-
mental power in the field of religion.16 In recent cases the Supreme
Court has differentiated between the two clauses and applied them
independently. In probing the constitutional limits of aid to educa-
tion, the Establishment Clause is the primary constitutional stand-
ard.' 7 Thus, in Everson v. Board of Education,18 the Establishment
Clause was first held applicable to the states.19 However, the Supreme
Court's consideration of the constitutionality of private schools and ear-
lier forms of aid started long before Everson. Although the starting
point for the church-state doctrinal development by the Supreme Court
is Everson, some mention of the pre-1947 cases is necessary in order
15. The constitutionality of aid to parochial schools at the Supreme Court level
began with the Court's decision in 1947 of Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947); For a more extended review of these developments, see, Kauper, The Warren
Court: Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67 MicH. L. REv. 269 (1968).
16. Supra note 10.
17. In order to understand the present status of the doctrine of the Establishment
Clause, it is necessary to understand the historical background of the doctrine.
The historical background of the Establishment Clause, including a discussion of its
pre-judicial history, may be found in Justice Waite's opinion in Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); in Justice Black's opinion in Everson v. Board of
Educ., supra note 15; in Justice Frankfurter's opinion in McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); in Justice Clark's opinion in Abington School District
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); in Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson v.
Board of Educ., supra note 15; cf., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); and in
2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTrIONAL LIMITATIONS 960-85 (8th ed. 1927).
18. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
19. The Free Exercise Clause was first held applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); accord, e.g.,
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942); West Virginia State Board of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573
(1944); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); cf., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175
U.S. 291 (1899).
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to place future decisions in proper perspective. Although the first
amendment was not at issue in these early cases, study of these de-
cisions will aid one in understanding why present litigation has come
so late in our constitutional history.
Closely related to the question of whether state aid may be given
to sectarian schools is the question of whether parents have the consti-
tutional right to send their children to church-related schools. The
question involves the doctrine embodied in the Free Exercise Clause of
the United States Constitution. 20  The initial case to face the question
was Meyer v. Nebraska.21  In Meyer a teacher was convicted for
teaching a course in German in violation of a Nebraska statute pro-
hibiting the teaching of foreign languages in public or private elemen-
tary schools. At issue was the question of whether the state had the
constitutional right to prescribe the curricula of church-related schools.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision holding:
[T]hat the State may do much . . . in order to improve the quality of its citizens,
physically, mentally and morally is clear, but the individual has certain fundamental
rights which must be respected. 22
The fundamental right to one's free exercise of religion as expressed
in a religious education was recognized. The significant point of Meyer
is that parents have the right to control the education of their children.
The legitimacy of a private school education was established in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.23  Pierce involved an Oregon statute that
required all parents who had children between the ages of eight and
sixteen to send their children to public schools. The Supreme Court
held that the statute was violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as an unreasonable interference with the lib-
erty of the parents to determine the education of their children. The
Court, citing Meyer, reinforced the right of parents to control the ed-
ucation of their children when it held: "The child is not the mere
20. For development of this idea that religious freedom is the central concern
of the first amendment and that the principle of church-state separation is de-
fensible only as long as it promotes religious freedom, see KATZ, THE CASE OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, IN RELIGION IN AMERICA 95 (J. Cogley ed. 1958). See also,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), where the Court held that "the
right to educate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to the States by the
force of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
21. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
22. Id. at 401.
23. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The decision was not based on the first amendment's
Religion Clauses, which had not at this time been held applicable to the states.
The Court relied instead on the economic due process concepts finding that the
statute constituted a deprivation of school property.
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creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right . . . to prepare him for additional obligations." 24  The
importance to be derived from the decision is that although parents
are compelled to send their children to school, Pierce holds that parents
will have the freedom to exercise their constitutional right to send their
children to private schools. The relevance of these early cases to the
discussion of aid to parochial schools is: (1) Pierce is often used
as the basic argument on which sectarians have traditionally founded
their case for parochial schools and for public aid to private schools;
(2) the Meyer and Pierce cases mean very little in constitutional terms
because they were not first amendment cases; and (3) although Pierce
upholds the legitimacy of parochial education, the subsequent decisions
of the Court do not imply a constitutional duty on the part of the state to
give financial aid in support of these schools. 25
With the legitimacy of the pluralistic educational system established,
the proponents for governmental support of sectarian institutions sought
to justify aid by government. The first theory advanced was the "child
benefit theory," the name given to the concept that the state may ex-
tend certain welfare aid to students attending church-related schools in
situations where general aid to the parochial schools themselves would
be unconstitutional. 26  This theory first was expressed in Borden v.
Board of Education,27 which involved the challenge of a Louisiana
statute under which children attending both public and private schools
were furnished textbooks free of charge by the state. The state supreme
court approved the program on the theory that "school children and the
state alone" 28 are the beneficiaries of the program and not the private
schools that the children attended. It was carefully noted by the
court that the parents formerly purchased the books, therefore, the
benefits were to the parents and not the schools. Further, the books
24. Id. at 535.
25. See DiCenso v. Robinson, supra, note 2, at 123, wherein the court rejected
the argument that parents may not constitutionally be denied the benefit of public
tax funds to educate their children because they elected to exercise their constitu-
tional right to send them to parochial schools. See also, Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) for the derivation of the argument. See also, Freund, Public
Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1686-87 (1969) for a complete
discussion of this argument.
26. See, LaNoue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Transporta-
tion and Medical Care, 13 J. PUB. LAW 76 (1964); and LaNoue, Religious Schools
and Secular Subjects, 32 HARV. EDUC. REv. 255-61 (1962).
27. 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929).
28. Id. at 1020, 123 So. at 661.
were loaned to the children and the books thereby remained the prop-
erty of the state.
The companion case of Cochran v. Board of Education29 was heard
by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in approving
the statute adopted the language of the state supreme court:
[Tihe appropriations were made for the specific purpose of purchasing school books
for the use of the school children of the state, free of cost to them. It was for
their benefit and the resulting benefit to.the state . . . . The schools, however,
are not the beneficiaries of these appropriations . . . . The school children and
the state alone are the beneficiaries.8 0
The criteria established by the case in analyzing financial assistance
statutes under "the child benefit theory" is a two-step process: (1)
Determine the legislative intent; and (2) ask the question-who re-
ceives the aid-the church-related school or the parent and child?
31
This theory is important because it runs throughout the Supreme
Court's consideration of the Establishment Clause.
It was against this background that the Supreme Court considered
Everson v. Board of Education,8 2 the Court's most serious consideration
of the question of public funds for private schools. Everson concerned
the challenge of the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute author-
izing reimbursement to all parents for money they expended for the
bus transportation of their children to schools on the public transporta-
tion system. In a five-four decision the Court held that the statute
did not violate either the fourteenth amendment or the Establishment
Clause. 33 In the absence of specifically enunciated prohibitions in the Es-
tablishment Clause, the Court stated what the clause proscribes:
29. 281 U.S. 370 (1930). The suit was not based upon the Establishment or
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. The suit was based on the theory
that taxation for the purpose of school books constituted a taking of private prop-
erty for a private purpose.
30. Id. at 374-75.
31. See, Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education in American Con-
stitutional Law, 45 ILL. L. REv. 333 (1950); Fellman, Separation of Church and
State in the United States: A Summary View, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 427 (1950).
32. Supra note 15.
33. Although the majority upheld the constitutionality of the statute, a critical
analysis of the minority opinion establishes the basis of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Lemon and DiCenso. In Everson the majority refused to consider the
religious nature and primary function of parochial schools in relation to state aid.
Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent made extensive findings as to the character of
these schools and related these findings to the constitutional criteria he character-
ized as: "[w]hether the taxpayer constitutionally can be made to contribute aid
to parents of students because of their attendance at parochial schools depends
upon the nature of those schools and their relation to the Church." Supra, note 15,
at 21. This is substantially the same criteria used by the Supreme Court in
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Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can it force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.3 4
Having defined the meaning of the Establishment Clause, the Court
then described the relationship between church and state as: "The
First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That
wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach."35  The main concept of the clause that emerges from
this dicta in Everson is described as the principle of "strict no-aid" or
the doctrine of "strict separation. ' '36  The central tenet of the doctrine of
"strict separation" is that government cannot by its programs, policies or
laws do anything to aid or support religion or religious activities.3 7
The importance of the doctrine is that it has been used as the primary
argument for opponents of aid to parochial schools in later cases.
The majority, realizing that New Jersey could not give funds con-
sistent with the Establishment Clause in aid of religion, seized upon the
Free Exercise Clause and adopted the "neutrality principle" as justifica-
tion for the approval of the program.3 8  To the Court the Establish-
ment Clause "requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups
of [religious] believers and non-believers; it does not require the state
to be their adversary. '3 9  The form of aid to parents of parochial
Lemon and DiCenso. Furthermore, Mr. Justice Rutledge prophetically char-
acterized the ultimate form of aid that would evolve if the majority opinion was
followed, as: "Payment of transportation is no more, nor is it any less essential to
education . . . than payment for tuitions, for teachers' salaries .... ." Supra,
note 15, at 48. It is ironic that the dissent to a decision that would form the basis
of the evolution of aid to parochial schools should form the basis of the opinion that
may well end such evolution.
34. Supra, note 15, at 15-16.
35. Supra, note 15, at 18.
36. In support of a doctrine of absolute separation, see the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Everson v. Board of Education, supra, note 15, at 28.
37. The doctrine derives from the literal interpretation of the first amendment
phrase-"no law respecting the establishment of religion." Supra, note 15, at 19.
38. For a complete discussion of the "neutrality principle" see, Giannella, Re-
ligious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part H1: The Non-
establishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513 (1968); Choper, The Establishment
Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 260 (1968).
39. Supra, note 15, at 18.
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school children was characterized as public welfare legislation. As a
further justification, the Court carefully pointed out that the benefits
of the aid were directed toward the parents and children and not to
the schools. Therefore, there was an effective affirmance of the "child
benefit theory" as enunciated in Cochran. The third basis of the deci-
sion was that the aid was separable from religious instruction and that
no aid was paid directly to the church-related schools.40
The majority, while holding that public funds could not be used for
parochial schools, at the same time permitted some general welfare
benefits to go to all school children. The decision set forth the dual
responsibilities of the state in establishment matters as: (1) The state
must insure that no public funds are paid directly to church-related
schools; and (2) the state cannot exclude citizens from welfare pro-
grams because of their religion. The central question, then, became-
if the prohibition is not absolute, where can a reasonable line be drawn
short of total aid to the whole sectarian educational process? The test
suggested in Everson to determine where the line falls is, where the
benefit to the religious institution was indirect, it is constitutionally
permissible.
As a result of Everson two schools of thought had developed as to
the meaning of the doctrine of separation. The first was that of ac-
tive co-operation, i.e., the intent of the first amendment is that govern-
ment cannot give preferential treatment to one religion over all other
religions. The second theory was that of absolute separation, i.e., the
intent of the first amendment is to preclude any government aid to
religious groups, direct or indirect. 41  The paradox of Everson is that
40. Direct aid is also prohibited to parochial schools by state constitutions.
See ALA. CONsT. art. XIV, § 263; ALAS. CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARiz. CONST.
art. II, § 12, art. XI, § 7, art. XI, § 8, A.R.S.; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; CAL.
CONST. art. IX, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; DEL.
CONST. art. X, § 3; FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. I, § 3; GA. CONST. art.
VIII, XII, par. 2 (1966); HAWAn CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 3;
ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; IND. CONST. art. 8, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 6(c);
Ky. CONST. art. 189; LA. CONST. art. XLVI, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN.
CONST. art. VIII, § 2; Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 208; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8;
MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11; NEV. CONST. art. II,
§ 10; N.H. CONST. Pt. II, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, par. 2; N.M. CONST.
art. VII, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. IX, §§ 4, 12 (1868);
N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 152; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5;
ORE. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; PA. CONST. art. 3, § 15; R.I. art. 12, § 4; S.C. art. XI,
§ 9; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 16; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEx. CONST. art.
VII, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. 10, § 13; VA. CONST. art. X, § 141; WASH. CONST.
art. IX, § 4; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 4; WIs. CONST. art. I, § 18, art. X, § 2;
WYo. CONST. art. VII, § 8.
41. 30 Albany L. Rev. 58 (1966).
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although it was the first case to hold that the Establishment Clause was
applicable to the states, it resolved the issue without applying the es-
tablishment doctrine. 42
McCollum v. Board of Education43 was the first case in which the
Supreme Court struck down a statute for giving aid to religious groups
and was the first case considered by the Court after Everson. The
factual pattern in McCollum involved an Illinois program of released
time whereby religious teachers of various faiths were permitted to
come into public school buildings weekly, and substitute religious train-
ing for secular training. The Court was asked to renounce the appli-
cability of the Establishment Clause to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. The Court rejected the argument 44 and relied upon the
definition of the Establishment Clause in Everson as the basis of it.
holding. The Supreme Court held that the state provisions for instruc-
tion of religious subjects in public school buildings was "beyond all
question a utilization of the tax established and tax supported public
school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith."' 45
McCollum is significant because it further develops the doctrine of
separation of church and state. It is also a rigorous affirmance of
the no-aid principle for parochial schools. McCollum stands as a judi-
cial rejection of the doctrine of active co-operation. If aid was given
to religion in McCollum, the active co-operationist would reason, it was
permissible aid, as it did not give preferential treatment to any one
religion over another. Since all religious groups could give instructions
within the schools, none were preferred. However, the Court found
that this was aid to all religious groups prohibited by the language of
the Establishment Clause. 46  The fact that distinguished the Illinois pro-
gram from the payment of transportation costs, is the Supreme Court's
analysis of the resulting church-state relationship not present in the New
York enactment. The fact that there was close co-operation between
42. The majority opinion is often regarded as highly paradoxical for its non-
application of the principles it set down in relation to the establishment clause.
Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent characterizes the majority opinion as: "The case
that irresistably comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who,
according to Byron's reports, 'whispering 'I will ne'er consent,'-consented.'"
43. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
44. Id. at 211-12.
45. Id. at 210.
46. Quoting Everson v. Board of Education, supra note 15, the Court relied
upon the definition of the Establishment Clause and the specific phraseology:
"[Nleither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another." [emphasis added] Supra, note 15, at 15.
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school officials and religious leaders, the use of tax supported property
and the compulsory nature of attendance created an impermissible in-
volvement between church and state.
Four years later in Zorach v. Clauson,47 the Supreme Court ap-
proved a New York "released time" program. Under the statute,
public school children were allowed to leave school during the day to
receive religious instructions in nonpublic school buildings. Although
the factual circumstances are similar to the program in Illinois, they
differ in critical areas. In Zorach there was no use of the public
school buildings; students left school premises to attend classes in reli-
gious schools. Further, there was no expenditure of public funds. All
costs were paid by the religious organizations. Finally, there was no
compulsory attendance requirements as in the Illinois plan. These crit-
ical differences between the two programs were the basis that allowed
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, to find that the statute in New
York was constitutional. 48  The decision represents a major shift in
attitude by the Court from hostility toward religion to one of accommoda-
tion and co-operation. Justice Douglas noted that our history as a
nation has been one of a religious people. State encouragement of re-
ligious instruction and co-operation with religious authorities to that
end was held constitutionally acceptable as long as state accommoda-
tion did not require the use of public buildings and funds. 49 The re-
leased time program in New York respected "the religious nature of
our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs." 50  This co-operation between state and church to encourage
the religious need of the nation has been termed the "accommodation
theory." 5' 1 In essence the theory, as propounded in Zorach, is that the
government may in some instances grant preferred treatment to reli-
gious liberty. The theory later was extended to require government
to grant preferred treatment to religious liberty.52
47. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
48. The differences expressed are perhaps the only basis upon which the deci-
sions can be distinguished, because the Court openly admitted that both programs
provided aid to the church-related schools.
49. Supra, note 47, at 315.
50. Supra, note 47, at 314.
51. See KAUPER, SCHEMPP AND SHERBERT, STUDIES IN NEUTRALITY AND Ac-
COMMODATION, 1963 Religion and the Public Order 3, 10-23 (1963).
52. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), a Seventh Day Adventist was
refused by the state of South Carolina unemployment compensation benefits because
she refused to accept a job that required her to work on Saturdays as it was
against her religious beliefs. The Supreme Court held that South Carolina had
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Zorach is significant in the doctrinal development of the Establish-
ment Clause because it rejects the strict no-aid dicta in Everson. To
accomplish this, Justice Douglas adopted the theory of co-operative sep-
aration as an alternative to the extremes of active co-operation and
absolute separation. In formulating the theory the Court clearly states
that the theory of co-operative separation recognizes the principle of
separation of church and state. "[T]he separation [of church and
state] must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment
within the scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition
is absolute. ' '53  However, Justice Douglas rejected the view that an
application thereof necessarily prohibits all intercourse between church
and state: "The First Amendment, however, does not say that in
every and all respects there shall be a separation between Church and
State."'5 4  The Court summarized the theory in stating: "The consti-
tutional standard is the separation of Church and State. The problem,
like many problems in constitutional law, is one of degree." 55
The effect of the Zorach decision was threefold. First, the decision
reflects the philosophy of co-operative separation. Second, the de-
cision adopts the accommodation theory as a constitutional standard
that more nearly approximates the yet undefined meaning of neutrality
alluded to in Everson. Benefits of state action would no longer have
to be classified, as in Everson, as public welfare legislation in order to
win constitutional approval. Rather, the Court had declared that it
was appropriate for government to accommodate the religious interests
of the people.56 Third, the Court does not identify what is prohibited
by the Establishment Clause due primarily to the lack of a "test" that
could be applied to future cases.57
violated the free exercise clause and that the petitioner was entitled to receive un-
employment benefits. This is an illustration of constitutionally required accom-
modation.
53. Supra, note 47, at 312.
54. Supra, note 47, at 312.
55. Supra, note 47, at 314.
56. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court, stated: "Whether ...
[it is done] occasionally for a few students or regularly for one; or pursuant to a
systematized program designed to further the religious needs of all the students does
not alter the character of the act." Supra, note 47, at 313.
57. The intervening cases after Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 47, did little to
add to the development of the Establishment Clause doctrine. All the cases relied
on past cases and were a simple reiteration of the doctrine that had been de-
veloped earlier. The only exception that could be ascertained was the Court's
decision in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The test absent in
Zorach was first conceptualized in McGowan, a Sunday Closing Law case. The test
would later be refined and firmly established in Abington School District v.
[Vol. XXI
1972] CASE NOTES 795
In Abington School District v. Schempp,158 the Supreme Court for
the first time proposed a positive test. In Schempp, children in public
schools were required to read passages from the Holy Bible at the be-
ginning of each school day. The Supreme Court held that the Pennsyl-
vania statute was violative of the Establishment Clause.59 Justice Clark,
writing for the Court, stressed the principle of neutrality in regard to
governmental relationships with religion as the constitutional standard.60
The Court recognized that complete neutrality between church and
state is logically impossible. 61 Further, to Justice Clark neutrality meant
that government must be neutral in its educational programs as in all
its programs. Since public schools were neutral, any religious cere-
mony such as Bible reading violated that neutrality., 2  The concept of
neutrality that had evolved from the past cases was termed "wholesome
'neutrality' " by Clark. 63 However, there was also a stern warning that
the breach of this neutrality would not be tolerated. 64
The test propounded by Mr. Justice Clark as to neutrality was sug-
gested as:
What are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If either is the ad-
vancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legisla-
tive power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular purpose and a pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 65
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). As to other Sunday Closing Law cases, see, e.g.,
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961). The other major Establishment Clause cases after Zorach see, e.g., Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
58. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
59. See also, Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (companion case to
Schempp).
60. By a process of selective quotation, Mr. Justice Clark manages to find that
"wholesome 'neutrality'" has been the Court's guiding light in past cases as well.
Supra, note 58, at 217-22.
61. Supra, note 58, at 220.
62. Note, however, the position of the Court that is taken in regards to the
Bible's use in the educational process: "[O]ne's education is not complete without
a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the
advancement of civilization. . . . [T]he Bible is worthy of study for its literary and
historic qualities." Supra, note 58, at 225.
63. Supra, note 58, at 222.
64. Justice Douglas' concurrence contained a strong and explicit warning against
the use of public funds to promote religious exercises: "The most effective way to
establish any institution is to finance it; and this truth is reflected in the appeals
by church groups for public funds to finance their religious schools." Supra, note
58, at 229.
65. Supra, note 58, at 222.
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The Court, in applying the test in Schempp, found that the legislation
was motivated by non-secular purposes. 6
Under this test each statute is considered in two ways: (1) The
purpose of the enactment; and (2) the primary effect of the enact-
ment. The first area is a reiteration of the test first employed in Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland,6 7 a Sunday Closing Law case.A' The second as-
pect of the test revolves around the concept of the term "primary."
The term "primary," standing by itself, was interpreted to mean that
any statute is not self-defining. In the Wisconsin case of Reynolds v.
Nusbaum6 ' the term was interpreted to mean that any legislation aiding
the category of private schools had the effect of primarily advancing
religion. 70  The test has been widely criticized for the use of the term,
often described as ambiguous 71 and limited in scope.
Although Schempp represented a significant development in the first
amendment doctrine, neither the concept of neutrality nor Clark's test
appeared very decisive when applied to the issue of aid to parochial
schools. 72
The test fashioned in Schempp was first applied by the Supreme
Court to a program of aid to nonpublic education in Board of Educa-
tion v. Allen.73 Allen involved a New York statute requiring local
school boards to purchase textbooks and to lend them free of charge
to all children in private or public schools. The Court upheld the
statute as neutral with respect to religion. 74  The decision relies heavily
upon Everson and accompanying theories within that decision. The
reliance upon Everson is evident in three aspects. First, the Court
66. Supra, note 58, at 223.
67. McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 57, concerned the indictment of various
merchants for the sale of goods specifically prohibited by Sunday Closing Laws.
The Supreme Court characterized the laws as "public welfare legislation." The
Court decided to uphold the legislation even though it provided incidental benefits
to religion. The basis of the Court's decision would later be refined in Schempp as
the "secular purpose doctrine." The Court held in McGowan that the present
purpose of the legislation was secular because it was enacted to provide a uniform
day of rest and recreation.
68. Supra note 57.
69. 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962).
70. Id. at 157, 115 N.W.2d at 765.
71. See, Valente, Aid to Church Related Education-New Direction without
Dogma, 55 VA. L. REV. 579, 595 (1969).
72. See DiCenso v. Robinson, supra, note 2, at 118-20, where the district
court found the Schempp test unworkable.
73. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
74. Id. at 236.
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categorized the legislation in Allen within the realm of public welfare
legislation. Once the statute was thereby characterized, the Court ra-
tionalized that "the Establishment Clause does not prevent a State from
extending the benefits of state laws to all its citizens without regard to
their religious affiliation. . .. -"7 Secondly, the Court adopted the
"child benefit" theory to the substantive aspects of the case. The bene-
fits of the legislation were seen as flowing to the child and parent and
not to the schools.76 Mindful that Everson had expressly warned that
any form of direct aid to church-related schools would be prohibited,
the Court noted that under the program " . . . no funds or books are
furnished to parochial schools. . . . "77 The Court in Allen as a further
justification under Everson placed textbook lending within the sphere
of incidental aid to secular schools and, therefore, permissible.
The third aspect of Everson found in Allen is the most significant.
At this point the Court could have stopped and relied solely upon
Everson as precedent for upholding the legislation. However, the Court
chose to adopt the test enunciated in Schempp as the test of constitu-
tionality. In candid recognition of the limitations of the "secular pur-
pose" doctrine, the Court admitted that the test was hard to apply.78
As ground work to applying the test to present enactment, the Court
initially applied Everson,79 thereby showing the caution with which it
approached the doctrine. The Court, applying the test to the present
statute, found the express purpose of the statute to be secular in
nature. Further, it held that there was no evidence to indicate the
"principal or primary effect of the statute would be to advance or inhibit
religion."'8 0  The effect of the adoption of the secular purpose doctrine
in Allen was to effectively replace Everson as the principal case in
this area of constitutional law.
The Allen decision is in no sense clear authority, however, for a
broad program of aid to nonpublic education. The Court repeatedly
stressed the lack of evidence that religious books had been loaned.81
75. Id. at 242.
76. Id. at 242.
77. id. at 243-44.
78. Mr. Justice White writing the opinion of the Court said of the test:
"[Tihis test is not easy to apply, but the citation of Everson by the Schempp
Court to support its general standard made clear how the Schempp rule would be
applied to the facts of Everson." Id. at 243.
79. id. at 243.
80. id. at 245.
81. "Absent evidence, we cannot assume that school authorities, who con-
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The case came to the Supreme Court on an appeal reversing an order
for summary judgment. This limited record is particularly significant in
relation to the cases of Lemon and DiCenso.s2  One scholar of consti-
tutional law has indicated that the decision in Allen would have been
different had there been evidence within the record of the religious
character of the church-related schools.83  The effect of this evidentiary
shortcoming was to leave in doubt the decision for opponents to show
that books loaned were taught from a religious frame of reference or
that the religious character and purposes of the schools permeated the
entire educational process.
Neutrality, accommodation and secular purposes were the three main
constitutional principles facing the Court when it considered the case
of Walz v. Tax Commission.8 4  Walz, in retrospect, is, perhaps, the
most constructive decision in the judicial development of first amend-
ment doctrine. The Court was confronted for the first time with the
precise question whether a property tax exemption for religiously owned
and used property was constitutionally valid. The decision is constructed
into two separate and distinct parts. Chief Justice Burger utilized the
first portion of the decision as a compilation and summarization of first
amendment doctrine that had evolved since Everson. Walz did not
contain an historical analysis as in previous decisions. Rather, the
Chief Justice noted that to the men who had written the Religion
Clauses, "establishment of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial
support and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. '8 5
The general principle deducible since Everson regarding the Establish-
ment Clause was stated as: "[W]e will not tolerate either govern-
mentally established or governmental interference with religion."8 6  Bur-
stantly face the same problem in selecting textbooks for use in the public schools,
are unable to distinguish between secular and religious books ....... Id. at 245.
82. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Pennsylvania case came
to the Supreme Court on an appeal for granted motion for summary judgment as
did the Allen case. However, the Allen court refused to make any assumptions
upon either the character of the parochial schools, as primary beneficiaries of the
statute, or the possible religious nature of the books. However, the Court in
Lemon did make the assumption that the Catholic schools were primarily re-
ligious in nature. These assumptions proved crucial to the ultimate decision.
Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Allen, admonished the majority for not making an
investigation of the religious purposes of the parochial schools. Id. at 254-67.
83. See Professor Freund's argument in Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969).
84. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
85. Id. at 668.
86. Id. at 669.
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ger felt that this was accomplished through a judicial policy of "benevo-
lent" neutrality and accommodation of religion. Therefore, the theories
of neutrality and accommodation were given judicial approval under the
"new" Burger Court. Likewise, the decisions in Everson and Allen
were also upheld. s 7
The second part of the Walz decision involved the determination of
the issues at hand. The Court chose to adopt the secular purpose
and primary effect test advanced in Allen. The Court found that the
New York statute neither advanced nor inhibited religion.8s Having
determined the statute's purpose to be constitutionally permissible, the
Court turned to the more difficult determination of the statute's pri-
mary effect. The Walz Court chose to alter the determination as ex-
tablished in Allen by formulating a new standard: "We must . . . be
sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government
entanglement with religion. The test is inescapably one of degree."8 9
Applying the new standard of entanglements to the facts of the case,
government taxation of religious property would increase only the de-
gree of involvment. 90
The "entanglement test," thus, was placed in two spheres. The
first was whether the involvement would be excessive and second whether
the involvement would require continuing surveillance by the state or
the church. The re-evaluation of the Court's approach to the Estab-
lishment Clause problems was highly significant. The shift in the
Court's thinking is subtle but important. Viewing the Court's posture
on the meaning of the Religion Clauses, the inference to be drawn is
that the thinking of the Court has shifted to a more restrictive view of
the Religion Clauses. However, there was considerable thought that the
Court's approval of the principles of neutrality and accommodation
would lead to a judicial approval of governmental aid to religion.
If any real controversy existed as to the effect of the entanglements
doctrine on future decisions, it was settled abruptly when the Court in
Lemon and DiCenso said of Walz: "[T]hat holding . . . tended to
confine rather than enlarge the area of permissible state involvement
87. Id. at 671-72.
88. For a detailed discussion of the establishment cases before Walz, see Note,
The Establishment Dilemma: Exemption of Religiously Used Property, 4 SUFFoLK
U.L. REv. 533 (1970).
89. Supra, note 84, at 674.
90. Supra, note 84, at 674. "Elimination of exemption would tend to expand
the involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property.
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with religious institutions." 9 1  The Court then expanded the entangle-
ments concept by setting forth three specific areas of inquiry to be
used as a general framework to determine the constitutionality of any
program rendering aid to private schools:
In order to determine whether the government entanglement with religion is exces-
sive, we must examine the character and purposes of the institutions which are bene-
fited, the nature of the aid that the State provides and the resulting relationship be-
tween the government and the religious authority. 92
With the statutes set against this framework as the constitutional stand-
ard, the Court concluded "that the cumulative impact of the entire
relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive
entanglement between government and religion."19 3
To this new criteria the Court added the two part secular purpose
doctrine. The cumulative criteria by which the constitutionality of
a statute is to be tested centers on four questions when the entangle-
ments and secular purpose doctrine are combined: (1) Does the stat-
ute reflect a secular legislative purpose?; (2) is the primary effect to
advance or inhibit religion?; (3) does its administration foster an ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion?; (4) does its imple-
mentation inhibit the free exercise of religion?
The legislative purpose of both statutes was intended to enhance
the quality of education in all schools. This legitimate concern for
educational standards was seen by the Court to be secular in intent.
However, unlike Allen where the religious character of the church-
related schools was not an issue, here the Court gave specific recognition
of the sectarian purpose.9 4  The preoccupation with the religious as-
pect compelled the Court to put aside the consideration of the primary
effect of the statute and to move instead into the consideration of the
entanglements aspect. Relying upon the extensive findings of the dis-
trict court on the religious character and purposes of parochial schools
in Rhode Island,95 the Court found that the aid was religious in na-
ture. The Court declared it could not ignore "the danger that a
teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the separation
of the religious from the . . . secular aspects. . . ,, a of education.
91. 403 U.S. 602, 614.
92. Id. at 615.
93. id. at 614.
94. The sectarian purpose of religious institutions, including schools was first
given judicial recognition in Walz v. Tax Commission, supra, note 84, at 677-78.
95. DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 123 (D.R.I. 1970).
96. Supra, note at 617.
[Vol. XXI800
CASE NOTES
Although both states set forth restrictions to ensure the nonideological
role of teachers, the Court regarded the restrictions as an attempt to
separate the inseparable. The very restrictions on which the states
relied to guarantee the secularity of the programs proved to be their
undoing. The only assurance of separation could come from "con-
tinuing state surveillance," thereby resulting in entanglements. Also,
the resulting relationship was further entangled by the provisions in
both statutes for the state audit of the school records. Reiterating the
warning in Walz of the potential for governmental interference in re-
ligion when government supports churches, the entanglements test was
extended to include the "potential" of state involvement in the inhibi-
tion of the free exercise of religion.
The second plateau of entanglement is found in the traditional basis
and historical foundation of the Religion Clauses. The Court cited as
a broad base of entanglement the divisive political potential of these
state programs. The Court seemed fearful of the often bitter political
conflict that usually erupts when state legislatures consider assistance
to parochial schools. Fear of political controversy was a controlling
factor in the adoption of the Religion Clauses by the framers of the
Constitution,9 7 and this fear has been a constant issue in prior Court
decisions. The effect of this second analysis of entanglement would
seemingly be to forbid state statutes from granting aid to parochial
schools that would require periodic appropriations to made by a state
legislature.
While the decision at first glance seems restrictive in nature, there
is no attempt by the Court to reverse its prior holdings in Everson and
Allen. However, the Court does distinguish the two cases from the
cases at hand by stating that the payments there were made to the
students and not the schools.98 By this distinction the Court has given
viability to the "child benefit theory" in this area of the law. Books
under Allen are also nonideological in nature, while teachers are not.
Significantly, the Court recognized in open approval of Zorach that
the "prior holdings do not call for total separation. . . . Some re-
lationship between government and religious organizations is inevita-
ble."99  However, in light of the decision, the inevitability of these
contacts does not mean that the state is free to engage in relationships
97. For discussion of the warnings of James Madison of the potential for
political controversy over religious appropriations see Justice Rutledge's dissent
in Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 15.
98. Supra, note 91, at 602.
99. Supra, note 91, at 614.
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that will extend government involvement to the ultimate direction of
church schools. The Court distinguishes Walz on the issue of entangle-
ments by stating that these innovative programs in Lemon and DiCenso
are self-perpetuating and self-expanding and are decidedly different
from the state-church involvement of over 200 years that resulted in
no entanglements. 100
Justices Douglas and Black in their concurring opinion stand in stark
opposition to the Court's holding. Although they concur with the es-
tablishment doctrine, their attitude is entirely hostile toward religion.
Those who patronize parochial schools in exercise of their constitutional
right are viewed as dissenters not in the mainstream of American
life. They would reject all forms of aid-direct or indirect. A fre-
quent argument made by proponents of parochial aid is that these
schools save the taxpayer money. Justice Douglas said precisely of
this argument:
And the argument is made that the private parochial school system takes about $9
billion a year off the back of government-as if that were enough to justify violat-
ing the Establishment Clause. 101
Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring, charted the course followed by Amer-
ican judicial history to emphasize that public subsidy of sectarian schools
is unconstitutional. 0 2  The lone dissent is made by Justice White who
criticized the Court for creating an insoluble paradox:
The State cannot finance secular instruction if it permits religion to be taught in the
same classroom; but if it exacts a promise that religion not be so taught ...and
enforces it, it is then entangled in the 'no entanglement' aspect of the Court's Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence. 1 08
Mr. Justice White says that he would sustain the Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island legislation on the basis that the states are financing a
"separable secular function of overriding importance." 0 4  The substan-
tial benefits that flow from the programs to religion and other private
interests do not convert the laws into establishments of religion.
The decision on Lemon and DiCenso are important to the develop-
ment of the establishment doctrine. The decision represents the first
explicit test in this area of constitutional law. The effect of the test is
100. Supra, note 91, at 624-25.
101. Supra, note 91, at 630; see also Dunn v. Addison Manual Training
Schools for Boys, 281 Ill. 352, 117 N.E. 993 (1917), where this argument was
specifically rejected.
102. Supra, note 91, at 642-61.
103. Supra, note 91, at 668.
104. Supra, note 91, at 664.
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to restrict the number of possible forms of aid that are acceptable
within the constraints of the Establishment Clause. Legislation in this
area must not only meet the requirements of secular purpose and pri-
mary effect, it must also not incorporate into the programs the secular-
religious distinctions and policing that proved fatal to the Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island statutes. However, the elimination of these restric-
tions may place these statutes in the face of another dilemma-direct
aid to parochial schools. 10 5  The decision further affirms the theories
of neutrality, accommodation and child benefit, implying that all forms
of aid must still conform to these constitutional standards as well. It
is significant that the Court did not say that aid to education in paro-
chial schools is unconstitutional. The implication is that there are
acceptable alternatives to the programs that were found unconstitu-
tional in these decisions.
In attempting to weigh which forms of assistance might be accept-
able to the Court, a valuable starting point is provided by the following
statement of the Chief Justice in Lemon and DiCenso:
Our decisions from Everson to Allen have permitted the States to provide church-re-
lated schools with secular, neutral or nonideological services, facilities or materials.
Bus transportation, school lunches, public health services and secular textbooks sup-
plied in common to all students were not thought to offend the Establishment
Clause.' 06
This passage when read in conjunction with the dictates of the en-
tanglements test suggests that the Court may accept the types of aid
that meet the following criteria: (1) All school children, public and
private, participate in the program; (2) the aid provided is in the
form of secular services and materials; (3) the assistance does not re-
quire daily distinctions between what is secular and what is religious
education; and (4) the program does not require the church-related
school to sacrifice its independence in religious matters.
As acceptable alternatives the states may seek to expand the aid to
parochial school children in the form of the earlier programs of trans-
portation'07 and textbooks.'0 8 However, any aid aimed at the pay-
105. Supra, note 91, at 616.
106. Supra, note 91, at 616, 617.
107. For state cases see e.g., Spears v. Honda, 51 Hawaii 1, 449 P.2d 130
(1968); Board of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963); Reynolds v. Nus-
baum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962); Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d
932 (Alas. 1961); Snyder v. Town of Newton, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770
(1960); McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953); Zellers v. Huff,
55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951); Visser v. Nookscack Valley School Dist., 33
Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949); Silver Lake School Dist. v. Parker, 238 Iowa
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ment for operating expenses' 09 will undoubtedly be rejected. There is
a relatively new form of aid originating within the state legislatures
providing for the payment of tuition of parochial school children. A
typical statute being proposed is a bill in the Illinois legislature." 0 The plan
provides in relative parts that parents of children in nonpublic elementary
and secondary schools will be issued a tuition voucher form when their
children enroll in parochial schools. Upon completion of the school
year, the schools will then submit the vouchers to the State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction. Upon the Superintendent's approval, the
Auditor of Public Accounts will be directed to issue payment to the
schools for the vouchers. The schools must account to the Super-
intendent as to how the money is spent. The proposed legislation falls
far short of complying with the constitutional restrictions enunciated by
the Supreme Court. First, the bill calls for the payment of the money
directly to the schools. Such direct funding has been prohibited since
the Court's decision in Everson and it is further prohibited by the
Illinois Constitution."' Further, the bill does not include all the children
within the state but merely parochial school children. The reporting
by the schools to the state of the use of the money is ominously similar
to the statutes found unconstitutional in Lemon and DiCenso. In re-
lation to the entanglements test, the character and purpose of the
schools benefited is religious in nature. The ultimate conclusion to
be drawn upon these facts is that the legislation as proposed has little
chance of securing judicial approval. It is submitted that the bill would
984, 29 N.W.2d 214 (1947); compare, Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 578, 258
A.2d 343 (1969); Alexander v. Bartlett, 14 Mich. App. 177, 165 N.W.2d 445
(1968); Rhoades v. Abengton, 424 Pa. 202, 226 A.2d 53 (1967); Squires v. City
of Augusta, 153 A.2d 80 (Me. 1959).
108. For state cases see e.g., Dickman v. School Dist., 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d
533 (1961); Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938); Haas
v. Independent School Dist., 69 S.D. 303, 9 N.W.2d 707 (1943); compare, Chance v.
Mississippi State Rating and Purchasing Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941).
109. Recent cases are-Opinion of the Justices, 356 Mass. 814, 258 N.E.2d 779
(1970); State ex rel. Chambers v. School Dist., 155 Mont. 422, 472 P.2d 1013
(1970); Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955).
110. 77th III. G.A. S.B. 853.
111. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, 3 (1870) also applicable to 1970 constitution.
ILL. CONsT. art. X, § 3 (1970) states: "Neither the General Assembly nor any
county, city, town, township, school district, or other public corporation, shall
ever make any appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in
aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school,
academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution,
controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant
or donation of land, money or other personal property ever be made by the State or
any such public corporation, to any church, or for any sectarian purpose."
[Vol. XXI
1972] CASE NOTES 805
have a substantially better chance of winning approval if the tuition
payment were made to the parent instead of to the schools. Initially
this would remove the prohibitions of direct payments to the schools,
the schools would not have to report any use of the funds and the
character of the schools would not necessarily be at issue since they
would only incidentally be benefited.
The Supreme Court is uncertain as to the proper course it should
set with respect to religious pluralism at the institutional level in Amer-
ica. Although religious pluralism at the individual level has been ac-
cepted by the Court, the Court is uncertain as to what to do about the in-
creasing entanglements between churches and state and federal gov-
ernments, especially in the areas of education, health services and wel-
fare activities. Although some form of collaboration may be accepted,
the prospects of the Court's approval of church-state collaboration are
uncertain at best.
Armand E. Capanna
